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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
SOUTH SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Respondent
Civil No. 15946

vs.
DON K. BARTON, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation action brought by the PlaintiffRespondent to obtain 24.49 acres of real property within the
City of Manti and owned by Defendant-Appellant.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Following a jury trial in June 1978, the DefendantAppellant was only awarded $1,633.00 per acre for the 24.49 acres
of land condemned and given to the Plaintiff-Respondent.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the jury award of value and
a new trial due to prejudicial irregularities and errors by
the Court during the trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant will refer to the Court Record and the trial
transcript as "R," and "Tr" respectively.
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Plaintiff-Respondent is the Board of Education of the South
Sanpete School District (R. at 55) (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as the "Board" or "Respondent").

Defendant-Appellant (herein-

after sometimes referred to as "Barton" or "Appellant") is a
resident of Manti in Sanpete County, State of Utah (Tr. at 172),
and was, prior to this condemnation action, the fee owner of 24.49
acres located within Manti City in Sanpete County.

(R. at 56)

On or about October 11, 1977, the Board by resolution
authorized the acquisition of Barton's 24.49 acres for the
construction of a high school in Manti City and negotiated with
(R. at 2, 55)

the Appellant for its purchase.

When the parties

failed to agree on a price for the land in question, Respondent
filed this action on October 25, 1977, to condemn the property.
(R.

at 1)
On January 23, 1978, the lower court granted Respondent's

Motion for Immedia-::e Dcc:upanc:y and Respondent filed a check with
the Court Clerk in the amount of $36,735.00 representing 75% of
Respondent's appraised value of $48,980.00 for the property.

(R.

at 16-17)
At the conclusion of the trial which lasted three days, the
jury found the value of the condemned property to be only
$40,000.00 (R. at 65), despite Respondent's claim in its Motion
for Immediate Occupancy that the property was worth nearly
$50,000.00.

Judgment awarding that sum to the Appellant was

entered June 12, 1978, and a final order of condemnation was
entered on July 10, 1978.

(R. at 77-79 and 82-83)

Thereafter,

this appeal was taken.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED DUE TO PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN THE LOWER COURT.
A.

The trial court erred in permitting Respondent to

introduce testimony surrounding the sale of land to the L.D.S.
Church after determining that such transaction was not relevant.
Appellant Barton called as an expert witness Mr. Marcellus
Palmer, a licensed real estate appraiser.

(Tr. at 36)

Mr.

Palmer testified that in his expert opinion this Barton property
in Manti City was worth $6,600.00 per acre.

Including the

agricultural building improvements, the property has a fair
market value of $166,084.00.

(Tr. at 102, 109)

Mr. Palmer's

opinion was based on six comparable transactions within the Manti
City area.
In addition to these comparables and also as a basis for
his expert opinion, Mr. Palmer attempted to show the comparability
of a sale of land from Grant Cox to the local L.D.S. Church.
at 100-101)

Mr. Palmer testified that the Church paid $10,000.00

for one acre of land located near the Defendant's property.
at 100)

(Tr.

(Tr.

Upon the objection of Respondent, the Court precluded

the witness or counsel from presenting testimony as to the
comparability of this sale.

(Tr. at 100-102)

Yet the Court

permitted cross examination of Mr. Palmer by Respondent's counsel
regarding this sale.

When Appellant thereafter attempted to

cross examine the Board's appraiser regarding this transaction,
Appellant was precluded by the Court:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE COURT: Now, I've heard enough of that.
Now, let's go
onto something else.
I think I've heard enough about this,
so let's go onto something else now.
The record should
indicate that this sale is not.relevant in these proceedings,
so let's go onto another questlon.
(Tr. at 270)
The following day when Court and counsel met in chambers,
the Board requested permission to call a Mr. Wilbur Cox who was
the L.D.S. stake president and had dealt with Grant Cox, the
seller, regarding the Church transaction.

(Tr. at 282)

Appellant

objected since Mr. Cox was not listed by counsel as a witness on
the witness lists exchanged five days prior to trial.

Other

witnesses that Appellant had tried to call had been excluded for
that reason.

(See Tr. 152.)

Also, Plaintiff's only "rebuttal

witness," Mr. Grant Cox, the seller of the land to the Church,
was in Salt Lake City and not available to testify on that day.
(Tr. at 282-283)

In the alternative, Plaintiff's counsel requestecl'

a continuance in order that the testimony of Grant Cox might also
be made available to the jury.

(Tr. at 283)

The Court noted Plaintiff's objections but denied them both.
Completely contrary to his previous ruling that the sale was "not
relevant," the Court allowed Wilbur Cox to testify and stated:
THE COURT: Your objection's noted and the motion to reopen
the record for this purpose is allowed.
The record should
further indicate that the Court has had personal knowledge
of this sale and is of the opinion that it would not be
proper to leave the jury with this set of facts at this ti~
and that to refuse to allow a clearing up of the record as
to that comparable sale would be reversible error and the
Court is of the opinion that it would be proper and fair to
allow the evidence and it would be improper not to allow it.
(Tr. at 283)
Thus, after determininq that such transaction was not
relevant, the trial court, over objection by Plaintiff's counsel.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

allowed the testimony of Wilbur Cox.

(Tr. at 282-285)

After emphasizing his prominent community and religious
position as the local stake president, Mr. Wilbur Cox was
permitted to give hearsay testimony that the seller, Grant Cox,
had certain religious and tax motives for selling the property to
the L.D.S. stake, without even requiring that Mr. Grant Cox testify
as to his motives.

(Tr. at 286-297)

Plaintiff submits that the effect of the above chain of
events at trial had a prejudicial impact on the jury.

The Court,

during Appellant's presentation of witnesses, ruled in front of
the jury that the sale to the "Church" was "not relevant in these
proceedings" and cut off Appellant's right to go into the matter
further.

(Tr. at 270)

Later, because of his "personal knowledge"

of the sale, the Court permitted Respondent to present the
authoritative testimony of the local ecclesiastical leader, a
"surprise" witness, who testified as to the intent and motives
of another without allowing Appellant the opportunity to rebut
the same.
The Court's comments, both in the presence of the jury and
in chambers, illustrate an abuse of discretion which resulted in
substantial prejudice to the Appellant.

Not only was Appellant

unable to go into the matter fully during his case in chief, but
was also later prohibited from rebutting the testimony of Mr.
Wilbur Cox when the Court reopened the issue because of its
"personal knowledge" of the sale.
The whole chain of events preve~ted Appellant from getting
out all the facts.

It not only unfairly allowed the Respondent
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to "correct" the record, but resulted in prejudicing the jury
against Appellant and his claims and "colored" the jury's view
towards the entire matter.
B.

The trial court erred in refusing to allow testimony of

Dee Ogden, the Board's appraiser, as to the nature of his employment.
The trial court, by limiting the scope of examination,
precluded Appellant from introducing the expert testimony of Hr.
Dee Ogden, a real estate appraiser who had made an appraisal of
the property for the School Board.

(Tr. at 278)

In its case in chief, the Board presented the testimony of
two appraisers.

(Tr. at 188, 248)

Mr. Gregory E. Austin testified]

that, in his opinion, the subject land was worth only $1,000.00
per acre or $27,500.00 with improvements; and Mr. Joseph Dan
Cloward testified that, in his opinion, the land was only worth
$1,250.00 per acre or $30,612.50.

(Tr. at 206, 252-253)

Appellant thereafter determined to call Mr. Dee Ogden, who
had made an appraisal of the property for the Board, as a rebuttal
witness.

(Tr. at 278)

Mr. Ogden had obviously not been called

by the Respondent School Board because his opinion as to the value
of the property was far greater than that of either Mr. Austin or
Mr. Cloward.

(Tr. at 278)

Upon the objection by the Board to

testimony of Mr. Ogden, Appellant made a proffer of proof that
Mr. Ogden, if called as a witness for Appellant landowner, would
testify that he had been hired and paid by the Respondent to
(Tr. at 278)

appraise the subject property.

The Court sustainecl

the objection of Respondent to that testimony and ruled that Mr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ogden could not testify as to the fact that he had been retained
by the School Board and paid a fee to appraise the property.

(Tr.

at 278)
Although the Court ruled that Mr. Ogden could give an
appraisal on the value of the property, the Court's ruling in
effect stripped the Appellant from the real value of Mr. Ogden's
testimony which may have partially offset the aura of "impartiality"
of the Board in dealing with Appellant.

It is obvious that Mr.

Ogden's appraisal was higher than Respondent's other two appraisers
because he wasn't called by Respondent to testify and because
Appellant wanted to put him on the stand.

Since Appellant's only

appraiser had valued the property approximately six times higher
than the two appraisers called by the Respondent, it would only
have been fair to permit Mr. Ogden, who would have given an "inbetween" appraisal, to testify for whom he had done the appraisal.
The jurors had a right to consider as evidence the fact that
the Respondent School Board had hired an appraiser and decided
not to use him as a witness at the trial because his appraisal
was more than the Board's other appraisers.

Evidence as to the

nature of employment of an expert witness is probative in weighing
his testimony, particularly where the "credibility" of the evidence
appeared to be a major issue at the trial.

Failure to allow such

testimony was reversible error and prohibited this jury from
considering all relevant facts in the case.

c.

The lower court erred in refusing to allow testimony of

Morgan Dyreng.
Another instance during the trial where prejudicial error
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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occurred was the Court's refusal to allow the testimony of Mr.
Morgan Dyreng.

Mr. Dyreng was the owner-seller of an entire city

block, consisting of five acres, located within Manti City which
was sold to the Respondent School Board in December of 1977.
(Tr. at 74)

The purchase price paid by the School Board was

$7,000.00 per acre.

(Tr. at 17B)

When Appellant's appraiser began to testify concerning that
purchase of the five acres as a "comparable sale" which had been
considered by him in his appraisal, the School Board objected on
the basis of the competency of that sale as evidence and requested
permission to call a witness in support of the contention that
the sale was not "voluntary."

The jury was excused and the

School Board then called its own Superintendent, Mr. Ronald E.
Everett, who testified that he had mentioned to the seller (Mr.
Dyreng) the possibility of a condemnation suit during the
negotiations.

(Tr. at 75)

In rebuttal to Mr. Everett's testimony, Appellant wanted to
call Mr. Dyreng himself to testify that the five-acre sale for

$7,000.00 an acre was not "under threat of condemnation" but was,

in fact, an arm's length transaction and sold for a fair price.
(Tr. at 81)

Appellant further argued that the School Board had

not met its burden of showing that the sale was as a result of
condemnation pressure and thereby not relevant herein.

(Tr. at

83)

Appellant's position was and now is that simply having the
power to condemn does not mean that every sale to an entity with
power of eminent domain is "under the threat of condemnation."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Tr. at. 83-84)
condemn"

The School Board urged that it was "the power to

(Tr. at 83) which colors the sale and makes it

involuntary and hence not relevant in the case.

(Tr. at 83)

Prior decisions of this Court establish that Appellant was
correct.

The mere fact that an entity has the power of eminent

domain does not exclude any sale to such entity as a "comparable
sale" on the basis that it is a forced sale.

For example, in

Salt Lake City v. Lewis, 30 Utah 2d 462, 519 P.2d 1344 (1974),
this Court held that evidence of a sale to Utah Power and Light
Company was permissible as a comparable sale even though the
utility had the power of eminent domain.

The Court observed that

such a sale does not prohibit the circumstance as being one from
a willing buyer to a willing seller.

519 P.2d at 1345.

Nevertheless, the trial judge herein denied Appellant's
request to call Mr. Dyreng to the stand to explain that the sale
was not "under threat of condemnation."

The Court said:

THE COURT:
I've heard enough.
It's the Court's opinion
that the sale would be in contemplation of condemnation.
The Court will not allow the testimony regarding the sale.
MR. BUSHNELL:
I have something else I'd like to take up
outside the jury.
THE COURT:
I'm going to take the next step, while I have
it in my mind and in view of that, it is the order of the
Court that no one present in this Court shall make any
further statements in the presence of the jury or in response
to this trial concerning this sale.
(Tr. at 85)
Thus, the result of that decision was to preclude Appellant
from using that sale as a "comparable" or even to show by testimony
of the owner-seller of the five-acre tract that it was a voluntary
sale and thus a "comparable sale" for Mr. Palmer to consider.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
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Mr. Palmer was precluded from saying any more on the subject of
that sale.

The jury was prohibited from considering the fact

that such similar property to Appellant's land had been purchased
for $7,000.00 an acre.

Certainly such evidence concerning a

tract comprising several acres should have been presented to the
jury which finally awarded Appellant approximately $1,500.00 per
acre.
Although such error was prejudicial in and of itself, the
prejudice was further compounded later in the trial by two
separate events.
First, Respondent's counsel was later permitted to question
the Appellant himself on cross examination about the sale of the
five acres to the School District.

(Tr. at 178-180)

For example,

the Court allowed the Board's attorney to ask the following
questions:
Q: Would it surprise you to know that the appraisal for
that land, for the land itself, was within five hundred
dollars an acre of the same appraisal for your land?

A:

I've been told that and it really bothered me.

Q:

Would it surprise you?

A:

It would really surprise me.

Q:
Do you know that I have shown that appraisal to one of
the counsel for this side of the table to demonstrate that
and I would be happy to show it to you? The point simply
is that for the land itself it was appraised at or near
the same figure as your land was appraised; isn't that true?

A:

I don't know because I haven't seen it.

(Tr. at 179)

Thus, in effect, the Court allowed the Respondent to get
into evidence the fact that its appraisal of the five-acre sale
was close to its appraisal of the Appellant's property.

This

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was done despite the Court's earlier ruling and despite the fact
that Appellant had been prohibited from putting in testimony as
to the sales price of that land at $7,000.00 per acre.
After the Court allowed Respondent to "reopen up" the issue,
Appellant's attorney was later censured in front of the jury for
trying to go into the same subject with Mr. Austin, one of the
School District's appraisers.

(Tr. at 210-211)

The second resulting prejudice was the position in which Mr.
Palmer (Appellant's only expert witness) was left in the eyes of
the jury.

Without being able to testify as to the five-acre

"comparable sale," he was left mainly with small acre-or-less
comparables.

The substantial prejudice occurred when the School

District's appraiser belittled Mr. Palmer for relying on sales
of very small tracts as comparables.

For example, Mr. Austin

testified in response to Appellant's question of comparability
of two other sales with smaller sizes:
A.
Well, that's just about everything, Brother. That's
everything.
There ain't no comparable. How can you compare
one acre with twenty five acres? There's no way. No way
in this world.
I would get kicked out of the Institute for
doing a thing like that, absolutely lose my designation.
(Tr. at 231-232)
Such prejudicial comments resulted from the Court's ruling
that Mr. Palmer's larger "comparable sale" was not to be considered
and obviously created the impression with the jury that sales
involving only small tracts of land had been used as comparables
by Mr. Palmer.
Thus, the improper ruling of the trial court served to
compound the prejudicial effects of the error of the trial court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generatedll
OCR, may contain errors.

in refusing to allow Mr. Dyreng to testify concerning his $7,000.0G'
per acre sale to the School District:
comparab~

1.

The jury was precluded from considering it as a

2.

The School Board was later permitted indirectly to get

sale;

in evidence before the jury of a purported appraisal of property
for a substantially lesser amount than what the property was
actually sold for; and
3.

Appellant's appraiser was put in a bad light as it looked

as if he relied mainly, if not exclusively, on sales involving
smaller tracts as his only comparable sales.
The jury could not help but be substantially influenced by
such error, as the

~inal

verdict herein illustrates.
POINT II

CUMULATIVE EfFEC: OF THE ERRONEOUS RULINGS IN THE LOWER
COURT.
A trial court has considerable latitude in a condemnation
case in deciding whether to admit certain evidence and testimony.
State of Utah By and Through its Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah
2d 317, 452 P.2d 872, 874

(1969).

However, despite the amount

of discretion given to the trial judge to control the trial, that
discretion is not limitless.
Although harmless and minor errors are bound to occur in
some trials, when an error occurs which provides "at least some
likelihood of a different result in its absence," the Supreme
Court is justified in reversing the verdict.
14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P.2d 1007, 1009 n.2

(1963).

Harris v. Harris,
See, also, Salt

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Utah 2d 313, 452 P.2d 869, 871 (1969);
wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 485, 487 (1967);
Paull v. Zions First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759,
961, n.S

(1966); Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003,

1005 (1966); and Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822
(1961).
Furthermore, when a case is tried to a jury, the rulings on
evidence need to be scrutinized on appeal more critically than
in a trial to the judge only.

Arnovitz v. Tella, 27 Utah 2d 261,

495 P.2d 310, 311-12 (1972); In Re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d
284, 288, 399 P.2d 442

(1965).

Appellant submits that rulings of Court during the trial, as
discussed herein, were so substantial and prejudicial that Appellant
was deprived of the opportunity of "a full and fair consideration"
of the disputed issue and fair consideration of the disputed
issues.

See Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia,

526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974).

See, also, Redevelopment Agency of

Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374
(Utah 1974).
The Supreme Court, in giving a trial judge latitude in
deciding what evidence to exclude, has used the standard of
"reasonable comparability" in the area of condemnation cases.
State By and Through Its Road Commission v. Wood, supra, at 874.
In Wood, the court observed that all parcels of property are not
alike and cannot be identical.

Thus, if another sale of land

can be said to have any "probative value" on the price of the
subject property, it should be admitted.

The fact that there
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are some differences between the comparable sale and the subject
sale goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its competency.
452 P.2d at 874.

Yet the trial court precluded Appellant on more

than one instance of presenting testimony of the comparability
of different sales of land.
The policy in condemnation cases is to permit all relevant
evidence to establish the true fair market value of the condemnee's
land.

See Weber County Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10

Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862

(1959).

Therein the court indicated

that adequate opportunity should be given the landowner to make
certain he receives the fair market value of his land inasmuch
as he is being forced by the State's police power to forfeit his
property.

This Court stated that it was error for the lower court

to refuse to allow Lhe landowner to testify as to the price he
paid for the

la~c

E :

~

years earlier.

The Court held that any

probative information should be admitted.

Differences in

comparability, if any, go to the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility:
"Such sales, [of the same property] when made under normal
and fair conditions, are necessarily a better test of the
market value than speculative opinions of witnesses; for
truly, here is where money talks."
347 P.2d at 864.
Although we are not concerned here with the admissibility of the
original purchase price of the subject property, the analogous
policy argument remains--evidence of prior sales should be allowed
with appropriate explanations to the jury inasmuch as they are
"a better test of the market value than speculative opinions of
witnesses."

While Appellant was prevented from giving a full

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and fair presentation of his evidence as to certain sales,
Respondent was permitted at length to dispute the applicability
of such sales.
Weber County v. Ward, supra, also discussed the importance
of cross examination of witnesses.

Therein, the condemnee was

effectively denied the opportunity to cross examine an adverse
witness because of the witness' noncommital, irresponsive answers.
The court observed:
"The purpose of cross-examination is to give adversary
counsel the opportunity not only to inquire into uncertainties
relating to the testimony in chief, but to test its credibility.
Whatever may tend to explain, modify, or contradict the direct
evidence should be allowed. Even though it is generally said
that the trial judge has discretion to control cross-examination
within reasonable limitations, he should not so restrict it
as to prevent inquiry into matters having a direc~ bearing
upon vital issues as was done here." 347 P.2d at 865.
In the instant case, failure to allow

lrr.

Dyreng and Mr. Grant

Cox to testify in effect reduced the credibility of Appellant's
other witnesses and testimony.

Yet Respondent was allowed to

produce his own testimony regarding these sales and Appellant was
restricted in his cross examination.

Yet another illustration

of this occurred when Appellant sought to call a witness during
his case.

Appellant called Mr. Richard McFarlane to testify.

(Tr. at 152)

The School Board objected because Mr. McFarlane was

not listed on the pretrial witness list exchanged by counsel.
Despite Appellant's arguments that he had just learned of Mr.
McFarlane and that neither he nor his testimony would be a
"surprise" to the Board (Tr. at 152), the Court refused to let
him testify (Tr. at 153), which again prohibited the Appellant
from putting all the relevant facts before the jury.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant urges this Court to reverse the verdict and grant
Appellant a new trial.

Reversible and prejudicial error occurred

on several occasions during the trial, coloring the jury's findings,

I

prohibiting them from considering relevant and probative evidence
and alienating them from the Appellant in the case.

The cumulative,

effect of the errors resulted in substantial prejudice to the
outcome of the case and in an unfortunate miscarriage of justice.
Such prejudice should not be lightly rejected and passed over as
harmless error as the verdict indicates that the jury was affected
by the errors.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to grant a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted this

a-<11
day of March, 1979.

~·
Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON
Attorneys for Defendant
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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